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The Legal Innovation Sandbox
CRISTIE FORD1 AND QUINN ASHKENAZY2
Regulatory sandboxes are all the rage. They were piloted in the financial technology
(“fintech”) arena, first by the United Kingdom’s Financial Conduct Authority in June 2016.3 In the
years since, they have emerged in other areas including energy,4 drug approvals and health policy,5
autonomous vehicles,6 and innovative technology generally.7 There are surely more examples to
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come. Now, the sandbox concept has moved into the staid realm of legal professional regulation.8
This move holds real potential to modernize legal services provision and its regulation, in the
interest of access to justice.9
Financial regulators have accumulated considerable experience around effective sandbox
design, logistics, and implementation, and this experience can and should be brought to bear on
legal innovation sandboxes too. At the same time, extending the sandbox model into legal services
regulation requires both extrapolating from and modifying it relative to the model’s original
context. Transplants from one regulatory regime to another require careful thought, if they are to
achieve the objectives the new context’s regulators have in mind for them.
The legal services context actually lacks one of the main raisons d’être for sandboxes in the
fintech context: interjurisdictional competition. Countries, regions, and cities compete globally to
be the jurisdiction of choice for innovative, and presumably lucrative and beneficial, new business
models.10 Unlike financial services, which are global, legal services generally operate in contexts
characterized by regulatory barriers to entry, making legal services provision less open to
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competition and incumbents less vulnerable to challenge.11 The fintech space, like many aspects of
financial regulation, is also characterized by a market-oriented, consumer choice driven
understanding of value. Legal services regulation is much more focused on protecting the public
from unauthorized practitioners than it is on providing that public with the ability to make its own,
market-driven choices about whom to hire.
The legal services space also lacks another key driver, relative to fintech: the regulator’s
need for visibility into what innovative players are doing. In a context like fintech, which is
characterized by fast-moving innovation and within which congruence between reality and
regulatory constructs may be low, fragile, or diminishing, the sandbox offers regulators crucial
access to information that they might not otherwise have.12 By contrast, lawyers, especially in
North America, have long enjoyed statutorily-created monopolies over the provision of legal
services. Lawyers’ business models, including fee and partnership structures, traditionally have
generated disincentives for lawyers to find more efficient, cost-effective, or forward-looking
solutions in providing legal services. This means that innovation, fast-moving or otherwise, has
been relatively stunted. (This is changing, particularly among national US mid-market firms who
have adopted new client service and project management strategies in response to competition.13
11

Down the road, it is possible that subnational legal regulators could compete with one other based on how
innovative or open their legal services regulatory regimes are. The competitive advantages of doing so are less
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218-238 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2017) . On the tension between transparency, accessibility, and congruence in
drafting administrative rules, see Colin Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 Yale L.J. 65
(1983). See also Chris Brummer & Yesha Yadav, Fintech and the Innovation Trilemma, 107 GEO. L.J. 235 (2017)
(arguing that at any one time, regulators can only achieve two of three objectives: providing clear rules, maintaining
market integrity, and encouraging financial innovation).
13
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Yet, the competition remains among lawyers – whether in firms, housed in accounting firms, or
working as in house counsel – and not between lawyers and other legal service providers.)
Acquiring information about challenging, fast-moving innovation in their sector is not a problem
that legal services regulators tend to have.
Our somewhat counterintuitive claim here is that these factors actually strengthen, not
weaken, the argument for deploying sandboxes to foster innovation in legal services. The
controlled, small-scale, experimental sandbox format is probably especially well-suited to opening
up a closed or over-regulated industry. Sandboxes create opportunities for keen-eyed entrepreneurs
to pluck the low-hanging fruit of untapped market sectors and new efficiencies. By contrast,
making a sophisticated and innovative industry like London’s fintech space even more innovative
calls for much more sweeping, systemic reforms. Sandboxes are also able to carve out defined
exemptions, in the interest of increasing access to justice, within an otherwise comprehensive
statutory prohibition on non-lawyers providing legal services. This is a reasonable first step that
allows a legal services regulator to permit some competition from non-lawyer legal services
providers, without opening the public up to potential harm from entirely unregulated providers.
The sandbox also allows the regulator, and sandbox participants, to learn from experience. It can
give other legal service providers, such as independent paralegals, the ability to “scale up” and
develop viable business models, while the regulator identifies and seeks to mitigate possible risks
to the public. Each of these attributes stands to have a significant impact in the legal innovation
context.
We also argue that the notion that animates fintech sandboxes, of increasing competition in
the service of “consumer benefit,” is probably a useful, if unorthodox, way of thinking about
opening up legal services provision. It is true that assessing outcomes by reference to “consumer
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benefit” relies on a market-centering understanding of how to identify beneficial innovations. This
is in some tension with a legal regulator’s traditional understanding of “public benefit,” which
captures priorities such as safeguarding the public interest and the rule of law. It is also in
substantial tension with the justice-oriented and equity-oriented convictions that underlie our own
concerns about access to justice. We are not claiming that market forces (that is, consumer choices)
alone would be sufficient to achieve these fundamental priorities.14 They would not be. Even in an
innovation-fostering sandbox context, within which some regulatory requirements are lifted or
lightened temporarily, substantive regulatory requirements must still exist and be enforced. The
regulatory obligation to safeguard the public and the rule of law should not be whittled down to an
assumption that the market, or consumers themselves, will be able to distinguish a high-quality
product from a poor one.15 All the same, while this will not be true in all contexts, in our view these
tensions are not fatal here: in a context in which competition from non-lawyers has been stifled,
consumer choice and public benefit can and plausibly do overlap.
Just as importantly, legal innovation sandboxes must be structured thoughtfully to ensure
that they protect the particular values and obligations that are fundamental to the justice sector,
while also making space for new business models, and trying to address the access to justice
crisis.16 Whether legal innovation sandboxes live up to their potential will come down substantially
14

Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903 (1996); Daphna Lewinsohn
Zamir, Consumer Preferences, Citizen Preferences, and the Provision of Public Goods, 108 YALE L.J 377 (1998).
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Incentives, and the Role of Institutions, 26 J. BEHAVIORAL & EXPERIMENTAL FINANCE 100285 (2020). See also
Hilary Allen, Regulatory Sandboxes, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 579, 587 (2019).
16
Access to justice captures more than access to the formal justice system (courts, tribunals, judges, and
lawyers). Taking a user-centered and expansive approach, access to justice means that all people have adequate and
equitable access to the institutions, knowledge, resources, and services needed to avoid, manage, and resolve their
legal problems and disputes, with results that align with substantive and procedural norms (whether or not lawyers
are involved). See ACTION COMMITTEE ON ACCESS TO JUSTICES IN CIVIL AND FAMILY MATTERS, ACCESS TO CIVIL &
FAMILY JUSTICE: A ROADMAP FOR JUSTICE (Canadian Forum on Civil Justice 2013), www.cfcj5

THE LEGAL INNOVATION SANDBOX

to how they are built – including how well they are resourced, how thoughtfully they are designed,
and how well-suited they are to their particular context. As is so often the case with regulation, the
difference between a permissive free-for-all that undermines regulatory priorities, and a careful
experiment that stands to enhance legal service provision while also enhancing regulatory
understanding, comes down to implementation.17 Effective implementation requires that the
regulator permit innovation while appropriately mitigating risk, and staying attuned to fundamental
regulatory goals such as the protection of the public.
Sandboxes will not be an all-purpose panacea for what ails justice, access to justice, or the
legal profession in North America. They do, however, hold real potential as a response to the
particular structural problems in this sector. Drawing on global experience, this article offers
practical and conceptual considerations for developing and structuring an effective yet responsible
legal sandbox. Parts One and Two survey the emergence of the sandbox concept, in fintech and
now as extended into legal services and regulation. We set out four key normative priorities and
assumptions that underpin the sandbox concept, particularly around the perceived value of
innovation. These assumptions, which are unremarkable in the financial regulation context, seem
unconventional and even utterly novel when transposed to legal services regulation. We then
highlight a nested set of salient differences between the fintech and legal services contexts: these
really go to the fact that legal services tend to be self-regulated, by lawyers or courts, in the interest
of lawyers, who can be expected to have a predisposition in favor of their own profession over
whatever innovative new solution competitors may have to offer. This poses a substantial threat to

fcjc.org/sites/default/files/docs/2013/AC_Report_English_Final.pdf; Rebecca L. Sandefur, Access to What?, 148
DAEDALUS 49 (2019).
17
Cristie Ford, Principles-Based Securities Regulation in the Wake of the Global Financial Crisis, 55
McGill L.J. (2010); European Parliament, supra note 20.
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the feasibility of using sandboxes to permit innovation in legal services, and may call for some
form of independent sandbox administrator.
Drawing on this point and on lessons from fintech sandboxes, Part Three explores the
sandbox process, which can be conceptualized as a journey with four phases: application,
preparation, experiment, and authorization. Because good implementation is so crucial, our goal
here is to begin to develop a useful roadmap for designing and running a functional, effective
sandbox. Before we conclude, Part Four lays out additional considerations for operating an
effective, iterative, equity-aware, and robust sandbox that has the potential to generate prosocial
change in the legal services sector, without losing sight of the public protection and access to justice
concerns that must always animate regulation.

1: WHAT IS A SANDBOX? THE MOTIVATION BEHIND THE FINTECH SANDBOX
The innovation sandbox has been described as a “genuinely new addition to the regulatory
arsenal.”18 It is a formal, structured policy tool that has been established by a regulatory authority
and that, in Jiménez and Hagan’s evocative description, offers a “a safe playground in which to
experiment, collect experiences, and play without having to face the strict rules of the real world.”19
Alongside innovation hubs, statutory experiments, and other similar initiatives, sandboxes are part
of a suite of novel, innovation-friendly regulatory initiatives that have been developed over the past
five years.20

18

Brummer & Yadav, supra note 12, 291.
JORGE GABRIEL JIMÉNEZ & MARGARET HAGAN, A REGULATORY SANDBOX FOR THE INDUSTRY OF LAW 2
(Thomson Reuters Legal Executive Inst. 2019), https://law.stanford.edu/publications/a-regulatory-sandbox-for-theindustry-of-law.
20
Other complementary or alternative strategies for fostering innovation include regulatory forbearance and
information-gathering (wait-and-see and test-and-learn regimes, as well as learning from other jurisdictions),
regulatory and other support units (innovation hubs, accelerators, guidance units), ad hoc pilots of specific projects,
19
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Individuals and entities apply to enter the sandbox. Once admitted, sandbox participants
live test services, products, and business models that do not easily fit within, or are blocked by, the
existing regulatory framework. While in the sandbox, participants abide by specifically-tailored
supervision and data sharing requirements, scale limitations, and other risk-mitigating safeguards
that are designed to protect the public. In this way, the sandbox offers a controlled environment for
innovation that emphasizes, depending on the language used in the sector, consumer, investor,
and/or public protection. Once a participant’s sandbox trial comes to an end, the regulator reviews
the evidence and decides whether to authorize the participant to roll out its product, service or
model beyond the sandbox.21 Informed by what it learns from sandbox interactions, the regulator
may also choose to introduce more sweeping regulatory reforms. On its own, a sandbox cannot be
expected to drive transformational regulatory change. However, it can catalyze reform, particularly
in contexts which are relatively closed to innovation or competition; or, where conservative,
unclear, or excessively burdensome approaches to regulation dominate.22 A sandbox has the

the move to more proportional or risk-based licensing regimes, and broader legislative and/or regulatory reform.
Greg Chen, What Should We Realistically Expect from Regulatory Sandboxes?, CGAP (Oct. 30, 2017),
https://www.cgap.org/blog/what-should-we-realistically-expect-regulatory-sandboxes; U.N. Secretary-General’s
Special Advocate for Inclusive Finance for Development (UNSGA) FinTech Working Group & Cambridge Centre
for Alternative Finance (CCAF), Early Lessons on Regulatory Innovations to Enable Inclusive FinTech: Innovation
Offices, Regulatory Sandboxes, and RegTech (Office of the UNSGSA and CCAF 2019),
https://www.unsgsa.org/sites/default/files/resources-files/2020-09/UNSGSA_Report_2019_Final-compressed.pdf
[hereinafter UNSGA & CCAF] . See also European Securities and Market Authority (ESMA), European Banking
Authority (EBA) & European insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA]), FinTech: Regulatory
Sandboxes and Innovation Hubs, JC
2018 74, https://www.esma.europa.eu/sites/default/files/library/jc_2018_74_joint_report_on_regulatory_sandboxes_
and_innovation_hubs.pdf [hereinafter Joint Report]; European Parliament, Policy Department for Economic,
Scientific and Quality of Life Policies, Regulatory Sandboxes and Innovation Hubs for FinTech, PE 652.752 (Sept.
2020), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/652752/IPOL_STU(2020)652752_EN.pdf
(contrasting “innovation hubs” and “regulatory sandboxes”); Stefan Philipsen et al., Legal Enclaves as a Test
Environment for Innovative Products: Toward Legally Resilient Experimentation Policies, 15 REGUL. GOVERNANCE
1128 (2021) (contrasting statutory experiments and regulatory sandboxes).
21
Generally this requires some form of regulatory change (e.g., explicit authorization for an experiment to
continue outside the sandbox, individual or general waivers, regulatory or supervisory reforms, or regulatory
guidance). REGULATORY SANDBOXES 8 (Toronto Centre 2017),
https://res.torontocentre.org/guidedocs/Regulatory%20Sandboxes%20FINAL.pdf [hereinafter Toronto Centre].
22
Mandepanda Sharmista Appaya et al., Global Experiences from Regulatory Sandboxes, World Bank
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potential to spark the kind of dialogue, cultural shifts, and consensus that are essential to making
subsequent, broader regulatory reform feasible.
Propelled by the rise in fintech, regulatory sandboxes began to emerge in the financial
sector in the mid-2000s.23 As of November 2020, 73 financial sandboxes were in operation, in 57
jurisdictions around the world.24 Fintech sandboxes have attracted a good deal of interest from
international and transnational bodies,25 think tanks and regulatory capacity-building institutions,26
and scholars.27 Empirical evidence related to sandbox effectiveness, as measured in different ways,
is still relatively thin.28 For our purposes, however, at least as important as measures of
effectiveness is the question of what the word “effectiveness” is measuring. What, exactly, is a
regulator seeking to accomplish when it establishes a sandbox?
Significantly, sandboxes – as a product of the financial regulation context from which they
come – foreground market-oriented mechanisms and techniques, rather than explicit normative

Group (WBG), Fintech Note No. 8, at 28 (Nov. 12 2020),
https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/912001605241080935/globalexperiences-from-regulatory-sandboxes; Chen, supra note 20.
23
Deirdre Ahern, Regulators Nurturing Fintech Innovation: Global Evolution of the Regulatory Sandbox as
Opportunity-Based Regulation (European Banking Institute, Working Paper Series No. 60, 2020); UNSGSA Fintech
Sub-Group on Regulatory Sandboxes, Briefing on Regulatory Sandboxes (UNSGA 2020),
www.unsgsa.org/sites/default/files/resources-files/2020-09/Fintech_Briefing_Paper_Regulatory_Sandboxes.pdf;
UNSGA & CCAF, supra note 20.
24
Key Data from Regulatory Sandboxes Across the Globe, WORLD BANK GROUP (WBG) (Nov. 1 2020),
www.worldbank.org/en/topic/fintech/brief/key-data-from-regulatory-sandboxes-across-the-globe.
25
See, e.g., Joint Report, supra note 20; European Parliament, supra note 20.
26
See e.g., Toronto Centre, supra note 21.
27
See e.g., Allen, supra note 15; Brummer & Yadav, supra note 12; Dirk A. Zetzsche et al., Regulating a
Revolution: From Regulatory Sandboxes to Smart Regulation, 23 FORDHAM J. CORP. FIN. L. 31 (2017).
28
A useful survey is Christopher Chao-hung Chen, Rethinking the Regulatory Sandbox for Financial
Innovation: An Assessment of the UK and Singapore in REGULATING FINTECH IN ASIA: GLOBAL CONTEXT, LOCAL
PERSPECTIVES 11 (Mark Fenwick, Steven Van Uytsel & Bi Ying, eds., 2020). See also Ahern, supra note 23, at 13
(discussing fintech sandboxes as pro-innovation market intervention); Brian R. Knight & Trace E. Mitchell, The
Sandbox Paradox: Balancing the Need to Facilitate Innovation with the Risk of Regulatory Privilege, 72 S.C.L. REV.
445, 475 (2020) (raising concerns about inequality in treatment between sandbox participants and non-participants).
In terms of evidence related to sandbox failures, it is still early days. With time, any unsuccessful, or less successful,
sandboxes will present learning opportunities for regulators, including perhaps evidence of what contexts are more or
less suited to sandboxes.
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commitments in the way that we might expect to see in some other regulatory arenas.29 This is not
to say that financial regulators do not potentially have genuine and sincere commitments to
achieving normative goals, such as financial inclusion.30 They may well do.31 However, financial
regulation since the American Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 193432
has been premised on the assumption that a fair and efficient market, enabled through boundary
conditions like disclosure mechanisms, and a degree of high-level prudential and registrant
regulation, will itself be the kind of creative force that is best placed to devise solutions to such
problems.
In finance, in major capital markets like London’s (as well as in securities regulation
generally), market forces play a significant role and innovation in new products and practices is
not subject to quality-based (as opposed to disclosure-based) regulatory scrutiny. Regulation
operates within a generally pro-innovation environment, so long as disclosure to customers and
prudential safety and soundness rules are observed. The high water mark may be the recent
assertion by an Australian government Minister regarding its fintech sandbox (albeit before that
country’s banking and financial services scandal), to the effect that “‘it is competition – not
regulation – that is the best means of ensuring consumers get value for money in financial

29
Of course, different financial regulators adopt different stances, and financial regulatory structures vary
between, e.g., the “twin peaks” model in Britain and Australia and the institution-driven models in North America. In
general, fintech sandboxes seem to adopt more of the market-oriented stance from securities regulation than the
prudential stance from banking regulation (as we would divide regulatory regimes in North America).
30
In the legal innovation space, the goal equivalent to improving financial inclusion would be improving
access to justice.
31
See e.g., Ivo Jenik et al., Do Regulatory Sandboxes Impact Financial Inclusion? A Look at the Data,
CGAP (April 30, 2019), www.cgap.org/blog/do-regulatory-sandboxes-impact-financial-inclusion-look-data. In
emerging markets, financial inclusion may be a central focus because sandboxes can enable innovations that are
likely to benefit excluded and underserved customers. Such sandboxes are in the minority, however, far outnumbered
by fintech sandboxes in established economies that are geared toward fostering innovation in general.
32
15 U.S.C. § 77a (1933); 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1943).
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services.’”33 As Deirdre Ahern has pointed out, the concept of the regulatory sandbox is premised
on “a public interest role for regulators in improving consumer choice, price and efficiency … a
completely different driver than a regulatory model predicated on risk-reduction.”34
With this in mind, the obvious goal of a fintech sandbox is to “facilitate financial
innovation.”35 This is sometimes also described as equivalent to or consistent with promoting
competitive innovation, market development, and presumably thus economic growth.36
Publications by the United Kingdom’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), which established the
first fintech sandbox, bear this out while also drawing a more explicit link between competition,
innovation, and consumer outcomes, and identifying the burden that “regulatory uncertainty” could
present for innovators in particular. In its initial November 2015 policy paper recommending that
a fintech sandbox be established, the FCA noted that it wanted “to promote competition by
supporting disruptive innovation.”37 It noted that regulatory uncertainty could discourage or slow
down innovation, make it more difficult for innovators to raise funds, and limit the number of
innovative products that entered the market.38 As a result, by reducing regulatory uncertainty, the
proposed sandbox “should lead to better outcomes for consumers through, for example, an
increased range of products and services, reduced costs, and improved access to financial
services.”39

33

As quoted by Anton N. Didenko, A Better Model for Australia’s Enhanced FinTech Sandbox, 44
U.N.S.W.L.J. 1078, 1079 (2021). On Australia’s banking scandal, see the ROYAL COMMISSION INTO MISCONDUCT IN
THE BANKING, SUPERANNUATION AND FINANCIAL SERVICES INDUSTRY (HAYNE ROYAL COMMISSION), FINAL
REPORT, vols. 1–3 (Commonwealth of Australia 2019).
34
Ahern, supra note 23, at 2-3 (emphasis added).
35
See, e.g., Joint Report, supra note 20, at 5.
36
Zetzsche et al., supra note 27, at 45-46, 68.
37
FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 3.
38
Id. ¶ 2.3.
39
Id. ¶ 2.4.
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After one year of fintech sandbox operation, the FCA concluded that the sandbox had
indeed reduced the time and cost of getting innovative ideas to market, had helped facilitate access
to finance for innovators, had enabled products to be tested and introduced to the market, and had
allowed the FCA to work with innovators to build appropriate consumer protection safeguards into
new products and services.40 In 2019, the UK FCA further reported that its fintech sandbox was
having a beneficial impact on firms, which could bring innovations to the market more quickly and
with greater regulatory certainty; on consumer outcomes, as both new and incumbent firms
improved their offerings as a result of increased competition; and on “contributing to the UK’s
supportive regulatory environment for Fintech” and bringing “positive innovation” to market on a
broad scale.41
As the FCA’s reference to the “UK’s supportive regulatory environment” suggests, at the
macro level, sandbox regimes are often expected to contribute to national economic growth or
serve to maintain the competitiveness of a market as a financial centre.”42 Indeed, simply because
it signals that a regulator is pro-innovation, a sandbox can spark innovation within and beyond the
sandbox, not only in the regulator’s jurisdiction but also potentially in other jurisdictions.43 Given
the economic promise that fintech can bring, regulators are motivated to produce tangible results,
and to compete with other jurisdictions for fintech business (including by acting more as
“consultant and ally” than as gatekeeper).44 The benefits seem to flow not only at the national

40

FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. (FCA), REGULATORY SANDBOX LESSONS LEARNED REPORT 5 (2017),
www.fca.org.uk/publications/research/regulatory-sandbox-lessons-learned-report.
41
FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. (FCA),THE IMPACT AND EFFECTIVENESS OF INNOVATE 12 (2019),
www.fca.org.uk/publication/research/the-impact-and-effectiveness-of-innovate.pdf.
42
Chen, supra note 20; Zetzsche et al., supra note 27 (also discussing innovation hubs as serving these
purposes).
43
Ahern, supra note 23, at 12-13; Zetzsche et al., supra note 27, at 61-62.
44
Ahern, supra note 23, at 11.
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economic level, but at the level of innovative fintech ecosystem: a country-level comparison across
nine leading fintech jurisdictions found that, relative to countries without sandboxes, the presence
of a sandbox can increase the scale of venture capital investment in a country, and increase the
probability that innovators will be able to raise funding to support their initiatives.45 Individual
sandbox participants can also expect other benefits, like personalized regulatory guidance (what
the FCA calls the “informal steer”).46 These kinds of results can theoretically generate knock-on
effects, such as attracting other innovators to the jurisdiction in order to take advantage of the
sandbox.47
There may be benefits that extend beyond these competition-oriented ones. A regulatory
sandbox can also potentially enhance firms’ understanding of regulatory and supervisory
expectations, can increase regulators’ knowledge about financial innovations, and, through direct
45

Jayoung James Goo & Joo-Yeun Heo, The Impact of the Regulatory Sandbox on the Fintech Industry,
with a Discussion on the Relation between Regulatory Sandboxes and Open Innovation, 6 J. OPEN INNOV. TECHNOL.
MARK. COMPLEX. 43 (2020). But see KPMG, THE PULSE OF FINTECH 2018: BIANNUAL GLOBAL ANALYSIS OF
INVESTMENT IN FINTECH 51 (2018), assets.kpmg/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2018/07/h1-2018-pulse-of-fintech.pdf;
FCA 2019, supra note 41, at 18-19; Giulio Cornelli et al., Inside the Regulatory Sandbox: Effects on Fintech
Funding (Bank for Int’l Settlements Working Paper No. 901, 2000). However, a 2019 survey by the World Bank and
Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance found that relative to sandboxes, innovation offices had assisted 12 times
more firms enter the market. World Bank & CCAF, Regulating Alternative Finance: Results from a Global
Regulator Survey (2019), openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/32592/142764.pdf . See also R.P.
Buckley et al., Building Fintech Ecosystems: Regulatory Sandboxes, Innovation Hubs and Beyond, 61 WASH. UNIV.
J.L. & POLICY 55 (2020) (arguing that innovation hubs are more effective than regulatory sandboxes, in building
fintech ecosystems).
46
FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 41, at 15-16.
47
We are not underplaying the potential risks, including that interjurisdictional competition can lead to a
“competition in laxity,” meaning regulatory arbitrage, a “race to the bottom,” and lower standards overall. Victor
Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX L. REV. 227 (2010-2011); Dale D. Murphy, Interjurisdictional Competition
and Regulatory Advantage, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 891 (2005). See also Hilary J. Allen, Sandbox Boundaries, 22 VAND.
J. ENT. TECH. L. 299 (2020) (arguing that, given competition between jurisdictions for fintech business, financial
innovation sandboxes exacerbate problems of regulatory arbitrage). The Joint Report and the European Parliament,
(both supra note 20, at 37-39 and 38-51 respectively) advocate for greater interjurisdictional regulatory cooperation
and knowledge sharing to address this challenge, and the challenge of unequal standards across jurisdictions, as do
Brummer & Yadav supra note 12, at 297-304. Nor are we claiming that sandboxes can create what Julia Black once
described as the fantasy of a “regulatory Utopia” in which public and private actors work in perfect synchrony. Julia
Black, Forms and Paradoxes of Principles Based Regulation, 3 CAPITAL MARKETS L.J. 425 (2008). Our point here is
to describe the purposes that fintech sandboxes have been claimed to advance. And, as discussed further below, we
do also claim that the controlled, time- and scope-limited nature of experiments within a sandbox (as opposed to, say,
a freestanding innovation hub) mitigates some concerns about generating a race to the bottom.
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testing, could inform regulators’ approach to regulating and supervising innovative financial
business models, products, and services.48 Because improved understanding should lead to
improved regulatory outcomes, some sandbox jurisdictions have identified their improved capacity
to meet their fundamental statutory objectives (contributing to financial stability, promoting
confidence, and ensuring consumer protection) as a justification for a sandbox.49 In the 2019 Global
Fintech Survey (GFS), 85% of regulators also reported that sandboxes helped them to assess the
appropriateness of their legal/regulatory frameworks, and 73% reported that the sandbox
contributed to building their own capacity.50
Using a sandbox to try to achieve more comprehensive or systemic reform, however, may
be less effective. In contexts where there is already considerable dialogue around and receptivity
to innovation – which may be the case by now in London’s fintech sector, and elsewhere – the
incremental, case-by-case approach that defines the sandbox may be less effective than more
comprehensive reform that, for example, tackles financial, legal, technical, or other barriers to
innovators’ business success.51 One study of sandbox effectiveness in fostering the particular goal
of financial inclusion found little evidence that they had driven the necessary formal regulatory
change.52 Formal regulatory change is not always the only meaningful indicator of regulatory
change. The impact of sandboxes on regulatory practice could also occur at a more informal level
(e.g., by helping regulators reinterpret existing rules), and those subtler changes could take time to
develop and become apparent to outsiders.53 Yet it is clear is that innovation sandboxes were not

48

Joint Report, supra note 20, at 19.
Id. (identifying Denmark, the Netherlands, Lithuania, Poland, and the UK).
50
Appaya et al., supra note 22.
51
Zetzsche et al., supra note 27; Chen, supra note 20; Simone di Castri & Ariadne Plaitakis, Going Beyond
Regulatory Sandboxes to Enable FinTech Innovation in Emerging Markets (BFA Global, Working Paper, 2018).
52
Jenik et al., supra note 31.
53
See, e.g., Julia Black, Regulatory Conversations, 29 J.L. SOC’Y 163 (2002).
49
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designed to catalyze comprehensive reform. They were and are designed to permit specific,
controlled experiments, tailored only to each of the particular sandbox participants that apply to
them.

2: WHY A SANDBOX TO STIMULATE LEGAL INNOVATION?
Legal innovation sandboxes are sometimes thought to be a very recent extension of the
fintech sandbox concept. In North America, the first legal sandbox was introduced in Utah in 2020.
However, part of the United Kingdom has had an operating legal innovation sandbox virtually as
long as it has had a fintech sandbox. In 2016, the same year that the FCA launched the world’s first
fintech sandbox, the Solicitors Regulation Authority (SRA) of England and Wales launched the
legal sector’s first sandbox. Dubbed the Innovation Space, the SRA’s sandbox set out to enable
current providers to develop their businesses in new ways, and to support new types of providers
in delivering new types of legal services for the first time.54 In early 2020, the UK Ministry of
Justice, UK tech incubator Tech Nation, and a panel of experts created LawtechUK, a taxpayerfunded innovation program with two key components: a Lawtech Sandbox, which “provides
pioneers who are looking to push the boundaries in legal industries with one-on-one support,
unique connections and practical support to help them maximise their output and drive change at
the highest level”; and a Lawtech Hub, described as “a space to learn and explore for all involved
in the future of law.”55 The Lawtech Sandbox also includes several units that support participants:

54

SRA Innovate, SOLICITORS REGULATION AUTHORITY (July 2021),
www.sra.org.uk/solicitors/resources/innovate/sra-innovate. Note that the Legal Services Act 2007 c. 29 (U.K.) has
permitted non-lawyer law firm ownership/management in England and Wales since late 2011. Accordingly, there has
been no need to test non-lawyer ownership/management in the SRA sandbox. Conversely, in the North American
context, legal sandboxes are effectively the only places in which to experiment with non-lawyer ownership and
management structures.
55
TECH NATION ANNUAL REPORT 2021, at 31, 35z8e83m1ih83drye280o9d1-wpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp15
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a Regulatory Response Unit, made up of relevant policymakers and regulators (including the SRA),
which provides a coordinated and expedited response to live challenges; a Business Unit, made up
of leaders from the business and legal communities, which provides technical, operational input,
and relevant datasets; and an Ethics Unit that provides applied ethics input as needed.56 It also
connects participants to mentors and experts within the Lawtech network.57 The Lawtech sandbox
welcomed cohorts of five and eight participants respectively in each of 2020 and 2021.
The Utah Supreme Court, with the support of the Utah State Bar, was indeed the first North
American jurisdiction to establish a sandbox for innovation in legal services.58 Initially planned as
a two-year pilot, the sandbox has now been extended to August 2027.59 Its overarching goal is to
improve access to justice by ensuring that consumers “have access to a well-developed, highquality, innovative, affordable, and competitive market for legal services.”60 Both non-traditional
legal service providers and traditional providers are welcome to apply to test out their ideas in the
sandbox. The sandbox describes its method as data-driven and risk-based.
As of November 2021, the Utah sandbox had received 52 applications and authorized 32
entities to offer services in the sandbox, including services provided by nonlawyers and by
software.61 For example, Rocket Lawyer offers software-supported legal document creation and
content/uploads/2021/10/Tech-Nation-Annual-Report-2021.pdf.
56
The Lawtech Sandbox, TECH NATION, technation.io/lawtechuk-vision/#the-lawtech-sandbox (last visited
Feb. 13, 2022).
57
The Lawtech Sandbox: Transforming the UK Legal Sector Through Tech, TECH NATION,
technation.io/lawtech-sandbox (last visited Feb. 13, 2022).
58
See Utah Supreme Court Standing Order No. 15 (amended June 3, 2021), utahinnovationoffice.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/07/Signed-Utah-Supreme-Court-Standing-Order-No.-15-Amended-June-3-2021.pdf;
INNOVATION OFFICE, supra note 8.
59
News Release, Admin. Office of the Courts, Utah Supreme Court to Extend Regulatory Sandbox to Seven
Years (April 30, 2021), utahinnovationoffice.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Sandbox-Extension-PR-4-21.pdf.
60
Utah Supreme Court Standing Order No. 15, supra note 58, at 7. The sandbox documents refer primarily
to “consumers,” and less commonly to “Utahns.”
61
OFFICE OF LEGAL SERVICES INNOVATION, INNOVATION OFFICE ACTIVITY REPORT: NOVEMBER 2021 (Dec.
20, 2021), https://utahinnovationoffice.org/knowledge-center.
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business incorporation services, complimented by human lawyer-provided legal services. 62 The
Timpanagos Legal Certified Advocate Partner Program empowers non-lawyer advocates to
provide low income clients with limited advice and representation related to protection orders and
stalking injunctions.

63

In a novel business structure experiment that would not otherwise be

permitted, a full-service law firm has partnered with a financial services company to provide clients
with more comprehensive legal and financial services. 64
In California, as of mid-2021, a State Bar Working Group was exploring the development
of a sandbox and making recommendations about sandbox scope and structure.65 In June 2021, a
Florida Bar Committee recommended the creation of a sandbox, called the Law Practice Innovation
Lab Program, to test alternative ways of providing legal services, including through non-lawyer
ownership, fee sharing models, and a limited assistance paralegal pilot program.66

62

See ROCKET LAWYER, www.rocketlawyer.com (last visited Feb. 13, 2022). For a history and analysis of
Rocket Lawyer’s prior battles with state bars (as well as those of LegalZoom and Avvo Legal Services), see
Benjamin H. Barton & Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice and Routine Legal Services: New Technologies Meet
Bar Regulators, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 955 (2019).
63
See Certified Advocate Partners Program, TIMPANOGOS LEGAL CENTRE, www.timplegal.org/legalservices/certified-advocate-partners-program (last visited Feb. 13, 2022).
64
See PEARSON BUTLER, www.pearsonbutler.com (last visited Feb. 14, 2022).
65
Closing the Justice Gap Working Group, THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, www.calbar.ca.gov/AboutUs/Who-We-Are/Committees/Closing-the-Justice-Gap-Working-Group (last visited Feb. 14, 2022). More recently,
the Closing the Justice Gap Working Group (CTJG) seems to have paused its meetings following forceful pushback
from the Chair of the state Judiciary Committee, who warned the group that “[a]ny proposal that would materially
change current consumer protections for clients receiving legal services and fundamentally alter the sacrosanct
principles of the attorney-client relationship would be heavily scrutinized by our Committees.” See Letter from
Assemb. Mark Stone, Chair, Assembly Comm. on Judiciary & Sen. Tom Umberg, Chair, Senate Comm. on Judiciary
to Ruben Duran, Board of Trustees Chair, State Bar Cali. (Dec 7. 2021), https://www.lawnext.com/wpcontent/uploads/2021/12/state-bars-ctjg-concerns-12-7-21.pdf. In response, see Letter from CTJG members to
Assemb. Mark Stone & Sen. Tom Umberg (Dec. 16, 2021), http://law.stanford.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2021/12/2021-12-17-Letter-to-Judiciary-Committee-Chairs.pdf. Also see Letter from Karen Thomas
Stefano, Admin. Director, Consumer Protection Policy Center, Univ. San Diego Law Sch. to Assemb. Mark Stone &
Sen. Tom Umberg (Dec. 16, 2021), https://www.sandiego.edu/cppc/documents/20211216-Letter-Re-CTJGFInal.pdf.
66
JOHN STEWART ET AL., “FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO IMPROVE THE DELIVERY OF
LEGAL SERVICES” (Florida Bar 2021), https://www-media.floridabar.org/uploads/2021/06/FINAL-REPORT-OFTHE-SPECIAL-COMMITTEE-TO-IMPROVE-THE-DELIVERY-OF-LEGAL-SERVICES.pdf.
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In Canada, the Law Society of British Columbia (LSBC)67 has been accepting applications
to its Innovation Sandbox, whose objective is “to improve access to justice by improving access to
legal advice and assistance,” since November 2020.68 It is Canada’s first legal innovation sandbox.
As of January 2022, eighteen applicants had been authorized to participate. These pilots include a
legal coaching service for self-represented civil litigants; an online platform that enables parties to
submit confidential settlement offers, which the platform will match where possible; a digital
process for creating wills and powers of attorney; a family law document creation and legal
information platform; and more than one paralegal who is being permitted, within defined
parameters, to provide legal advice and conduct negotiations without lawyer supervision.69 In
October 2021, the Law Society of Ontario launched Access to Innovation (A2I), a five year
regulatory sandbox pilot project focused on innovative technological legal services.70 That same
month, the benchers of the Law Society of Alberta approved the creation of its own Innovation
Sandbox.71 The Barreau du Québec is also in the process of developing a sandbox, reportedly
focussed on the use of technology and artificial intelligence in law.72 While Canadian law societies

67

Through the Legal Profession Act, S.B.C. 1998, c. 9 (Can.), the provincial government of British
Columbia delegates the regulation of the practice of law to the Law Society of British Columbia (LSBC). As part of
its mandate, the LSBC protects the public interest in the administration of justice by setting and enforcing standards
of professional conduct for lawyers. It also brings a voice to issues affecting the justice system and the delivery of
legal services. The LSBC is governed by 25 elected lawyers and up to 6 appointed non-lawyers, collectively known
as Benchers.
68
Innovation Sandbox, L. SOC’Y B.C, www.lawsociety.bc.ca/our-initiatives/innovation-sandbox (last visited
Feb. 14, 2022).
69
Approved Participants, L. SOC’Y B.C, www.lawsociety.bc.ca/our-initiatives/innovationsandbox/approved-participants (last visited Feb. 14, 2022).
70
Access to Innovation (A2I), L. SOC’Y ONT., lso.ca/about-lso/access-to-innovation (last visited Feb. 14,
2022).
71
Law Society of Alberta Introduces Innovation Sandbox, L. SOC’Y ALTA. (Oct. 1, 2021),
www.lawsociety.ab.ca/law-society-of-alberta-introduces-innovation-sandbox.
72
BARREAU DU QUEBEC, RAPPORT ANNUEL 2020-2021, at 33 (2021), www.barreau.qc.ca/media/2862/4rapport-annuel-2020-2021.pdf; ACTION COMM. ON ACCESS TO JUST. IN CIVIL & FAM. MATTERS, CANADA’S JUSTICE
DEVELOPMENT GOALS: 2020 CHALLENGE AND CHANGE 34 (2020), https://www.justicedevelopmentgoals.ca/reports.
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have not historically been global innovation leaders, they have moved quickly to build on the UK’s
and Utah’s examples in the time since the Utah sandbox was established.

A. FOUR KEY ASSUMPTIONS UNDERPINNING THE LEGAL INNOVATION SANDBOX
When it comes to innovation, there can be a somewhat romantic tendency to imagine that
innovation itself can offer some kind of transcendent solution to longstanding policy challenges.
To avoid underspecified objectives and unexpected outcomes, however, regulators have an
obligation to scrutinize particular regulatory strategies with reference to the policy objectives they
are charged with advancing. No regulatory move will resolve all policy questions or normative
choices, and trade-offs inevitably accompany any policy or regulatory choice. There are better and
worse regulatory design choices, and better and worse choices for a particular context, but neither
innovation on its own, nor regulation designed to deal with innovation, can possibly improve
outcomes across all conceivable metrics at once.73
For this reason, it is important to understand clearly what a regulatory regime – in this case,
the legal innovation sandbox – is hoping to generate, why the sandbox is believed to be the right
mechanism for trying to achieve those ends, and how to design a legal innovation sandbox in a way
that stands the best chance of achieving those ends. We have some sense of what counts as
“effectiveness” in the fintech context, as described above. Before launching a legal innovation
sandbox, the sandbox authority should also have at least a provisional understanding of what goals
it intends to pursue through the sandbox, and what assumptions it is making about the links
between, for example, innovation and access to justice. Although these are still early days in the

73

See, e.g., FORD, supra note 12, at 7-9, 79-84, 115-20, 131-35.
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development of legal innovation sandboxes in North America, we can identify some assumptions
underpinning the move.
First, in establishing a legal innovation sandbox, its champions must be assuming that
innovation in legal services (including products, practices, and business models) is actually
something that should be pursued. Sandboxes promote innovation by eliminating or reducing
regulatory barriers, thus empowering individuals and entities to innovate without worrying about
(or worrying less about) fines, liability, and other disciplinary actions.74 The fundamental principle
motivating legal experiments like sandboxes is that innovation, which could be stifled by regulation
in the absence of a sandbox, has the potential to be publicly beneficial. This observation may seem
trite and obvious. In fact, it is borrowing unfamiliar, innovation-friendly assumptions from a very
different regulatory space. This signals a significant and completely underappreciated move,
relative to how the legal profession has traditionally understood its obligation to protect the public
interest.
As Hilary Allen has pointed out, however, not all innovations are necessarily welfareenhancing enough to be promoted as a matter of public policy.75 What justifies allocating public
regulatory resources to a legal innovation sandbox is a second significant assumption operating
here: that innovation in legal services provision promotes the policy objective of increasing access
to justice.76 Put another way, it assumes that the legal innovation sandbox strategy should be
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Brooke MacKenzie, Regulatory Innovation with a Legal Tech Sandbox, SLAW (May 3, 2021)
www.slaw.ca/2021/05/03/regulatory-innovation-with-a-legal-tech-sandbox; Toronto Centre, supra note 21, at 9-10.
75
Allen, supra note 15, at 605-12; Hilary J. Allen, Experimental Strategies for Regulating Fintech, 3 J.L.
INNOVATION 1 (2020).
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Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Equity: An Analysis of Exceptions to Administrative Rules, DUKE L.J.
277, 317-22 (1982) (describing public interest policy exceptions to general rules, and their procedural and
substantive ramifications). There may be other specific priorities operating, too, which are seen as mechanisms for
advancing access to justice. For example, in British Columbia, the Law Society’s Paralegal Task Force promoted the
idea that the sandbox could help generate a ground-up, economically viable paralegal sector and avoid what it
perceived to be the failings of Ontario’s more top-down strategy for licensing paralegals. JO ANN CARMICHAEL ET
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preferred to, for example, more direct regulatory responses (such as mandating that every lawyer
provide a certain amount of pro bono services, allocated through some kind of public roster), or
more public funding (for example, funding legal aid regimes better or even “socializing” legal
services as Canada long ago socialized healthcare). The sandbox approach could theoretically be
assumed to be the best option for any number of reasons: (a) because it is cheaper, especially if
existing regulators develop the sandbox “off the sides of their desks”, (b) because other options,
especially more public funding, are unrealistic, (c) because sandboxes are à la mode, or (d) because
the sandbox actually offers real advantages, in access to justice terms, that the other options do not.
In fact, the fourth option is at least in play here. Because the sandbox allows non-lawyers to offer
legal services notwithstanding the statutory monopoly otherwise granted to lawyers, it stands a
chance of increasing both the volume and the variety of legal services available beyond what
lawyers alone could provide.
Third is the assumption that a sandbox can enhance access to justice, specifically by freeing
market forces to operate in legal services, thereby increasing consumer choice. Sandbox advocates
argue that they can fuel a cascade of positive changes in the legal services market by spurring
competition, pushing established players to adapt, and attracting investors and newcomers, as well
as enhancing regulatory guidance.77 As in the fintech context, we see an emphasis on consumer
choice and competitive market forces as a strategy for increasing the range, quality, and
accessibility of legal services for the public. Like the emphasis on innovation, this emphasis on the

AL., LICENSED PARALEGAL TASK FORCE REPORT (LSBC 2020), https://www.lawsociety.bc.ca/about-us/committees,task-forces-and-working-groups/committee-and-task-force-reports.
77
Toronto Centre, supra note 21, at 9-10. Conversely, but still based on market-for-innovation principles,
sandbox critics worry that sandboxes may deter investors and providers from doing business with or in the same
market as sandbox participants because of the risks associated with regulatory changes. See also Zetzsche et al.,
supra note 27 at 39-40 (discussing fintech sandboxes).
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mechanisms of consumer choice and market competition is a new transplant into legal services
regulation. Given the fundamental social importance of access to justice and the rule of law, the
pivot to a consumer choice centered model deserves careful scrutiny.
Mechanisms that advance access to justice are generally, and appropriately, understood to
also advance the rule of law. At the same time, whether or not it is explicitly stated, the idea of a
regulatory sandbox within which certain rules can be suspended also raises fundamental rule of
law concerns around equality of treatment, certainty, public accountability, and transparency.78
Equality is undermined because sandbox participants are, almost by definition, granted privileges
that their competitors outside the sandbox do not enjoy.79 Certainty is compromised because
sandboxes offer case-by-case rule relaxation. Public accountability suffers where the role of the
regulator becomes blurred. Indeed, through dialogue with participants and by setting an
experiment’s parameters, the regulator arguably even acquires a certain stake in its success and
becomes less than “arm’s length” in respect to the sandbox.
Poor communication can exacerbate transparency and equality challenges. For example,
investors, the media, and consumers may come to see sandbox participants’ practices as having
been de facto endorsed by the regulator, both while the participant is in the sandbox and after it
exits.80 An important fourth assumption behind the regulatory sandbox must therefore be that rule
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Philipsen et al., supra note 20. The authors reference the legality principle, noting that legality is
threatened when the regulator, exercising delegated discretionary powers, establishes a sandbox without explicit
authorization by the legislature. The scope of rulemaking authority that administrative agencies possess in the
relevant contexts make this concern less salient here. See e.g., infra note 132 and accompanying text; Legal
Profession Act, S.B.C. 1998, c. 9, § 3 (Can.)
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Knight & Mitchell, supra note 28, at 446-49, 462-75; Zetzsche et al., supra note 27, at 41.
80
Ahern, supra note 23, at 11-12; Knight & Mitchell, supra note 28, at 462-75; Joint Report, supra note 25,
at 35-37; Ivo Jeník & Kate Lauer, Regulatory Sandboxes and Financial Inclusion 10 (CGAP, Working Paper, 2017),
www.cgap.org/sites/default/files/Working-Paper-Regulatory-Sandboxes-Oct-2017.pdf. Sandboxes can also distort
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of law trade-offs either can be mitigated, or are justified at least on a temporary basis, in order to
advance the objectives above.
In this context, the details of how a sandbox is designed are clearly crucial.

B. LEGAL SERVICES INNOVATION VERSUS FINTECH: IMPORTANT CONTEXTUAL CONSIDERATIONS
Regulatory tools will have different effects depending on context. The legal and financial
innovation contexts are not identical, or perhaps even all that similar. Importing sandboxes into the
legal services context assumes that the sandbox model can work effectively in spurring legal
services innovation, in spite of significant contextual differences. As should be clear from the four
assumptions discussed above, the prospect of relying on innovation and improved consumer choice
as a mechanism for improving access to justice and safeguarding the rule of law is new and
unfamiliar. The sandbox mechanism is also being transplanted into a particular regulatory and
economic environment, whose characteristics explain both why a sandbox might be especially
well-suited to this environment, and why it is likely to encounter powerful headwinds.
In our view, the sandbox is especially well-suited to legal services innovation precisely
because there has been so little innovation to date. The legal profession has traditionally been a
particularly inaccessible, even monopolistic, industry characterized by legislatively created barriers
to entry. The widespread prohibition on non-lawyers practising law in North America (also
described as engaging in the “unauthorized practice of law”, or “UPL”) is a significant, statutorilyimposed, and generally scrupulously enforced boundary protecting existing means of delivering
services. Even innovation by lawyers has been limited as a result.81 As well, unlike the fintech

81
See e.g., Julian Moradian, A New Era of Legal Services: The Elimination of Unauthorized Practice of
Law Rules to Accompany the Growth of Legal Software, 12 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 247; MARY JUETTEN &
BILLIE TARASCIO, THE FIGHT AGAINST UPL: WINNING WITH TECHNOLOGY (Clio),
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context, interjurisdictional competition for legal services has been minimal because of geographic
limits on bar membership and practice.82 In this way, legal services regulation may have more in
common with financial regulation in less developed capital markets than with the environment in
an innovation-intensive capital markets hub like London. As the World Bank has suggested, in
contexts with relatively closed or conservative approaches to regulation and innovation, and/or
where regulatory requirements “are unclear or missing or create barriers to entry disproportionate
to the risks,” a sandbox may be the first step to opening up a dialogue, promoting cultural shifts,
and building the “stakeholder consensus needed to endorse or support broader regulatory
understanding and change.”83
On the other side of the ledger, literally posing risks to a sandbox’s survival, is the structure
of legal regulation itself. Bold, innovation-friendly legal regulators in the United States may face
anti-innovation and anti-sandbox lobbying and pressure from lawyers (including as channelled
through legislation, as may have happened in California84). The legal regulatory structure in
Canada may be even more closed to experiments that might alter the status quo. Law in Canada
continues to be a self-governing profession in a way that is now uncommon in other AngloAmerican jurisdictions.85 This makes lawyer-centric preferences more pervasive throughout the
regulatory regime itself. Canadian legal regulators (who are called “Benchers” of “Law Societies”)
are overwhelmingly lawyers, elected by their fellow lawyers. A Law Society’s primarily obligation

http://files.clio.com/marketo/ebooks/the-fight-against-upl.pdf.
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But see Stephen Gillers, A Profession, If You Can Keep It: How Information Technology and Fading
Borders Are Reshaping the Law Marketplace and What We Should Do About It, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 953 (2012).
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Appaya et al., supra note 22, at 26.
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See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
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Hill, supra note 9. In Canada, through enabling legislation, each province delegates the regulation of the
legal profession to a law society (i.e., a governing body) charged with upholding and protecting the public interest.
Each law society is governed by Benchers, a volunteer board of governors. Most Benchers are lawyers elected by
other lawyers.
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is to protect the public; it is not an industry association. However, the fact that the majority of
Benchers are elected by their lawyer peers arguably generates a de facto conflict when it comes to
new business models in particular, and to legal services offered by non-lawyers, such as
paralegals.86
The awkward reality is that lawyers are not universally financially successful even now.87
While sandbox initiatives may help make some of those lawyers’ practices more efficient and
potentially more profitable, in any time of change there will be winners and losers. For example,
some would argue that, relative to a full-service solo practitioner who only occasionally practises
in areas like real estate or wills, software based guided decision pathways and/or software-assisted
practice checklists and protocols implemented by a group of independent paralegals could produce
not only cheaper, but also more consistent and higher-quality services. Lawyers as a group will not
necessarily behave in entrepreneurial ways, and their concerns about access to justice could pale
in comparison to their concerns about their livelihoods. In this context, Benchers’ structural
position may limit how bold any Canadian Law Society might be prepared to be, if innovations
that advanced access to justice also had the potential to undermine lawyers’ profitability.
In British Columbia, section 13 of its Legal Profession Act further sharpens Benchers’
dilemma, because it provides Law Society “members” (that is, lawyers) with the power to demand
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Described another way, regulator-facilitated entry for new market participants “could be seen as
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a referendum and, if successful, to bind the Benchers to a particular course of action.88 These
structural and governance arrangements could have significant, adverse implications for increasing
people’s access to a broader range of legal services. For example, “meeting unmet need” – as the
British Columbia sandbox describes one of its objectives89 – may not actually be a perfect proxy
for “addressing access to justice crisis”: it does not address the possibility that a need, which
lawyers may currently be meeting in an expensive yet imperfect way, could be more cheaply and
comprehensively met by other practitioners or through other means. In our view, addressing the
concerns above requires that an independent sandbox administrator be established. We discuss this
further below.90
Even leaving these structural challenges aside, the fact that Benchers – like legal profession
regulators in many Anglo-American jurisdictions – are predominantly lawyers will affect their
orientation toward change, as well as their comfort and expertise in dealing with fast-moving
innovation. Regulators may require different training, a re-examined mindset, and new kinds of
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Legal Profession Act, S.B.C. 1998, c. 9, § 13 (Can.): “A resolution of a general meeting of the society is
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of the Legal Profession Act to become the Legal Professions Act (plural), and has signaled a strong interest in
creating a licensing regime for paralegals. See Bill 57, Attorney General Statutes Amendment Act, 3rd Sess., 41st
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Standing Order No. 15, supra note 58, at 7.
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See infra Section V. E.
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(completely teachable) skills to deal as effectively as possible with the changes that a more
innovation-friendly legal services environment may demand. These are the kinds of lessons that
resonate well beyond the particular context of legal services regulation, in any single jurisdiction.
Legal innovation sandboxes are an opportunity for legal services regulators to improve their own
methods. One could even hope that, in addition to potentially spurring innovation and increasing
access to justice, a legal innovation sandbox can be a mechanism through which to re-imagine not
only how legal services could be better provided, but also how they could be better regulated. Legal
regulators could use the sandbox to generate evidence and develop a risk-based, evidence-based
regulatory approach that has the potential to be more congruent with regulatory goals.91
The distinction between the rule of law priorities of lawyers and the market-perfecting or
capitalist priorities in finance is also potentially significant. There has been ongoing debate (among
lawyers) about the extent to which addressing the “justice gap” through alternative legal service
providers risks undermining the legal profession’s “core values.”92 In contrast, others like Rebecca
Sandefur argue that the profession’s perspective should not define the debate. She argues that we
should instead be imagining a more equitably distributed, resolution-focused, multidisciplinary
approach to justice that is not so myopically focused on “defin[ing] and diagnos[ing] peoples’
problems as legal, and provid[ing] the services that treat them.”93 From this perspective, although
Dr. Sandefur herself would disagree, others might conclude that the whole sandbox experiment
risks distracting us from unresolved justice problems writ large, of which formal legal needs are
just one, sometimes secondary, part.
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Even optimism about sandboxes’ potential to increase access to legal services could be shot
through with equity concerns. Service providers operating within a sandbox could potentially be
creating assembly-line, second-best forms of service for those that cannot afford bespoke services.
Form-filling software like that offered by Rocket Lawyer, arguably the legal services equivalent of
the “big box” store, are probably in a better position to take advantage of sandbox opportunities
than are individuals or smaller, more local groups (including independent paralegals, for whom a
viable business model is still emerging).94 Moreover, the ability to apply to a sandbox early and to
scale up quickly will have enormous knock-on effects if it turns out that the market for commodity
legal services, like many online markets today, is characterized by network effects and winnertake-all outcomes.95 Any legal services are likely better than no legal services, if that is the choice
– but is that the choice? What if the trade-off additionally comes with subtle but profound longer
term consequences for the rule of law or its perceived legitimacy at the local level? While we do
not know if this will be the case, the fact that neither law societies nor sandboxes at present have
an established role for some sort of Public Interest Advocate, or an Access to Justice Advocate,
means that sandboxes will not have an in-built public-oriented perspective as part of their decision
making. Over the longer term, we should not be resigned to the idea that cheaper services for
ordinary people, and bespoke services for corporations and the wealthy, are the best outcome that
we could aspire to.
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Working toward social justice more broadly, and working to create a more innovative
environment for legal services, are not mutually exclusive goals. We argue that in spite of their
risks and shortcomings, legal innovation sandboxes can be a promising tool for spurring market
competition and consumer choice. Moreover, if we are serious about addressing the access to
justice crisis, we should not discount the potential value of enhanced competition. We are not
suggesting that consumer preferences on their own are adequate to determine which innovative
products or services should come to dominate. As Cass Sunstein argued a generation ago, the
notion of “preferences” is reductive, if not meaningless, in trying to describe the multiple,
conflicting, socially constructed, and dynamic ways in which actual humans (as opposed to abstract
“consumers”) make choices in the world.96 We also say that legal service regulators must
continually re-examine their models and assumptions, to ensure they remain mindful of potential
disconnects between these market-oriented mechanisms and their fundamental regulatory
obligations to the public and the rule of law. The point here is only that, in descriptive and
instrumental terms, making more choices available to people who currently lack choices is a
legitimate objective. It is one that a thoughtfully-designed legal innovation sandbox can potentially
meet.

3: THE SANDBOX JOURNEY
A thoughtfully designed, explicitly access-to-justice-oriented sandbox design has the
potential to maximize benefits and minimize risks for members of the public and society as a whole.
An ill-conceived design is far more likely to turn those risks into reality. The sandbox is a controlled
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testing ground for actual experiments, and so it is crucial that the experiments be controlled. For
these reasons, the actual design and implementation of a sandbox initiative – those seemingly
mundane logistical details that in fact are the backbone of effective regulation97 – deserve to be
considered carefully. Because fintech sandboxes have been operating for longer, it makes sense to
learn where possible from their experiences, even while holding in mind the access to justice, rule
of law, and public protection concerns that animate the legal innovation space. Rule of law
concerns should be mitigated to the extent possible, including through transparency, thoughtful
messaging, regulatory attention to the public interest, and carefully designed scope, monitoring,
and reporting requirements.98
Before opening a sandbox, a sandbox authority will often establish general participation
terms that stipulate which conditions are and are not negotiable.99 Parameters limit the scope of
sandbox pilots. For example, a sandbox authority could set a maximum pilot duration, or impose
scope limitations on the type of practice that a participant may engage in.100 Conditions mitigate
risks and protect the public by stipulating the terms that all participants must comply with in order
to remain in the sandbox.101 For example, sandbox participants often have an obligation to report
regularly to the sandbox authority, sometimes using a reporting template, as a condition of
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participating.102 As a best practice, a newly created sandbox may also want to establish a set of
guiding principles to ensure that participants will act ethically and fairly and collaborate openly
with the regulator, while upholding the public interest and other core (in this case, legal) values.
Transparency throughout the sandbox process fosters public accountability and public trust,
and is consistent with rule of law principles including certainty, predictability, and nonarbitrariness.103 For example, prior to launching, the regulator may choose to make a public
announcement about the sandbox that provides details about sandbox goals, sandbox duration, and
rule relaxation limits.104 Regulators and sandbox authorities should also disclose, in a public and
timely manner, information about sandbox entry processes, criteria, and decisions, as well as the
parameters and privileges under which sandbox participants are operating.105 On its website, for
example, Utah’s Innovation Office publishes monthly sandbox reports and maintains an updated
list of authorized sandbox entities, with links to their Orders of Authorization.106
Regulators should also insist, as a condition of sandbox participation, that participants
provide them on with granular, high-quality data on an ongoing basis. As innovation arrives to
legal services, as is has to other sectors, it will be important that the sandbox operators understand
new technologies and the risks they generate. Regulators should ensure that systems are in place
to aggregate and analyze the data they are collecting, in order to learn not only about emerging
products, services, models, and their risks but also about evidence-based ways to improve their
own regulatory practice. When thoughtfully built, adequately resourced, and operated effectively,
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sandboxes have the potential to encourage transparent and open dialogue between regulators and
service providers.107
Although sandboxes vary in terms of their structures, processes and rules, an entity’s
journey through the sandbox can be broadly conceptualized as moving through the four phases
discussed below: the application phase, the preparation phase, the experimentation phase, and the
validation phase.108 Each raises its own set of considerations for a sandbox regulator or
administrator. The design choices they make will directly influence the sandbox’s effectiveness,
both as an innovation-fostering initiative and as a regulatory information-gathering and publicprotecting strategy.109

PHASE 1: APPLICATION TO ENTER THE SANDBOX
Most innovation sandboxes are designed to have an ex ante application process and
qualitative scrutiny of both applications and ongoing results.110 Common sandbox entry criteria
address the fit between an applicant’s proposal and the sandbox’s scope and goals, the potential
benefits to consumers, the potential risks to consumers, the applicant’s preparedness, the proposal’s
innovativeness, and the extent to which the proposed idea or thing actually needs to be tested in
the sandbox. Table 1 provides a visual overview of these criteria. Although “innovation” is often
included as an entry criterion, assessing innovation is a challenging and imprecise task; depending
107

Chen, supra note 20; Toronto Centre, supra note 21, at 9-10.
Joint Report, supra note 20, at 22.
109
As discussed later on, some regulators delegate partial or full sandbox responsibility to an arm’s length
sandbox administrator. The term ‘sandbox authority’ will be used here to identify the entity involved in developing
and running the sandbox, whether arm’s length or not.
110
Joint Report, supra note 20, at 22-4. A notable exception is the unique non-authorization model adopted
by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, which does not involve any screening of applicants upon
entry, for innovativeness or otherwise: Enhanced Regulatory Sandbox, ASIC, https://asic.gov.au/forbusiness/innovation-hub/enhanced-regulatory-sandbox (last visited Feb. 15, 2022; see also Didenko, supra note 33,
at 1085-87, 1100. Firms must however notify the regulator of their intention to use the sandbox provisions.
108

32

THE LEGAL INNOVATION SANDBOX

on how it is defined, an otherwise qualified applicant may be denied entry if it is not the first mover
in the market.111 For this reason, some jurisdictions do not impose innovation criteria and even
include provisions to favour first movers’ competitors’ admission.112
The “need” consideration is another interesting one, in that it suggests that regulation
“must” be lifted because it is a barrier to a potentially helpful innovation. In this respect, not all
“regulatory barriers” are created equal. The varieties of regulatory obstruction to innovation could
include, for example, the barrier to entry posed by having to understand and apply a complicated
set of regulatory requirements.113 This kind of regulatory barrier, which is often alluded to in the
fintech context, disproportionately affects (smaller, newer, start-up) firms that have lesser
resources to retain compliance and legal experts. As such it can insulate established incumbents
from potentially beneficial competition by new entrants. In the legal services arena, the prohibition
on non-lawyers engaging in the practice of law is a much more significant barrier to entry than the
regulatory regimes’ complexity.114 In our view, the substantive regulatory obligation to protect the
public can be attended to, in a structured sandbox context, in other ways including scope limits and
ongoing reporting.115 The prohibition on the unauthorized practice of law is a proxy for protection
of the public, not an end unto itself. The point here is that regulatory mechanisms that are designed
to protect the public or safeguard the rule of law should not be assumed, without reflection, to be
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regulatory “barriers,” and they should not be eliminated unless other methods to safeguard the same
objectives are put in place.

TABLE 1: GENERAL ENTRY CRITERIA116
Fit

Has the applicant presented a coherent vision of what it wants to test? Does the
proposed product, service, or model fall within the sandbox’s scope and will it
advance the sandbox’s objectives?

Innovation

Is the proposed product, service, or model innovative, novel, or sufficiently
different? Has the applicant explained how its proposal will promote
innovation?

Need

Does the applicant’s product, service, or model need to be tested in the sandbox
because it does not easily fit within or is blocked by the existing regulatory
framework? Has the applicant identified what regulatory relief instruments
(e.g., rule waivers) will be required?

Preparedness Is the applicant adequately prepared to enter the sandbox, meaning that its
product, service or model is ready to be tested with a clear plan, measurable
success criteria, and adequate allotted resources? Does an evidence-base
already exist?
Consumer
Public

/ Will the proposed product, service or model benefit consumers, either directly
or indirectly through increased competition and choice?

Benefit

116

We derive the criteria in Table 1 from Applying to the regulatory sandbox, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. (FCA)
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Consumer

Has the applicant outlined how it will interact with the public, identified the

Protection

risks, and considered appropriate safeguards?

Along with establishing baseline application criteria, a sandbox administrator may want to
consider ways to make the most efficient use of its available resources. In any regulatory initiative,
it makes sense to operate as efficiently as possible so long as efficiency does not supplant
substantive goals (which might be the case, for example, if a sandbox’s operations were assessed
in terms of throughput or outputs without reference to underlying priorities). In the sandbox case,
efficiency-enhancing tactics could include developing streamlined applications, intake cohorts, and
thematic sandboxes.
Some jurisdictions have adopted streamlined application processes, under which applicants
meet with sandbox staff before applying. Staff assist with troubleshooting and assess fit, which can
help manage intake and improve the quality of sandbox applications.117 Some have also adopted a
cohort approach. Instead of accepting applications and admitting participants on a rolling basis, the
cohort approach limits applications to one or a few windows of time per year, after which newly
accepted participants begin and run sandbox tests simultaneously. This can help to conserve limited
regulatory resources.118 With each new cohort, the sandbox’s design and operation can also be
refined to reflect learnings from the previous cohort.
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Some jurisdictions have introduced thematic sandboxes, either temporarily or permanently
limiting sandbox eligibility to target specific issues or promote identified policy priorities or
technologies.119 In Spring 2021, for example, the working group behind California’s legal sandbox
considered whether its sandbox should be open only to “firms that offer services to the unserved
and underserved,” or if its sandbox should be open to all service providers, including businesses
that focus on wealthy clients.120 While thematic sandboxes can help target resources, at least one
leader of Utah’s sandbox initiative has argued that new sandboxes should start with the broadest
possible set of subject matter entry criteria.121 Before sandbox experimentation begins, it is very
difficult, if not impossible, to predict exactly how innovation might develop.122 Targeting a
particular policy objective in advance could be counterproductive.
Once an entity submits an application to enter the sandbox, the sandbox authority evaluates
the application, potentially exercising considerable discretion.123 Sandbox administrators should
establish practices that qualitatively assess proposals to determine whether they meet statutory and
sandbox objectives. Subjective entry criteria should be minimized for rule of law reasons. The
exercise of discretion is of course a fraught area in Anglo-American and common law
Administrative Law.124 While administrative discretion is inevitable, and is probably especially
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essential in contexts defined by uncertainty or fast-moving change, unbridled discretion runs
contrary to basic rule of law principles.125 The essential point must be that, as with exercises of
public power generally, the exercise of discretion in sandboxes as elsewhere should not be
arbitrary.126 It must be constrained by the limits of statutory authority, must be justified with regard
to relevant priorities, and should be conditioned through explicit and accessible reasons or
rationales; that is, exercises of discretion should meet the compelling requirement that in Canada
is described as the “ethos of justification”:127 that “the exercise of public power must be justified,
intelligible and transparent, not in the abstract, but to the individuals subject to it.”128 Beyond the
individuals subject to it, clear information about what is taking place in the sandbox will also help
inform potential future applicants and will defend the sandbox authority against charges of
overreaching, undermining regulatory objectives, arbitrariness, or favoritism.129
Justification for allowing a participant to “play” in a sandbox should include a
determination about risk. Risk can, however, be assessed in different ways. Some authorities adopt
a proportionality test, which tries to weigh possible benefits against possible risks.130 For example,
to gain entry to Utah’s legal sandbox, applicants must as a threshold matter demonstrate that they
meet all requirements. For example, the proposal should advance the sandbox’s access to justice
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objectives. Once threshold conditions are met, the sandbox committee assesses three kinds of risk
that the proposal could raise: the risk of “(1) inaccurate or inappropriate legal result, (2) failure to
exercise legal rights through ignorance or bad advice, and (3) purchase of an unnecessary or
inappropriate legal service.” Significantly, risk of harm is measured not relative to an ideal state
but relative to the status quo in which, depending on context, the consumers in question might not
otherwise be able to access adequate or any legal services at all. In other words, to be admitted,
sandbox authorities must be satisfied that within each risk area, “the likelihood that the average
person will experience a harm using the applicant’s service is not greater than the likelihood that
the average person who might use their service will experience harm without the service.”131 In
keeping with principles of intelligibility and transparency, these criteria are made publicly
available, as is information on proposals that have qualified for entry to the sandbox.
After reviewing an application, the sandbox authority must decide whether to admit or deny
entry. In Utah, a legal sandbox committee makes a recommendation to the sandbox Board, and the
Board makes a recommendation to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court then has the discretion
to decide whether to authorize or deny an application.132 In British Columbia, the Law Society
exercises its rulemaking authority to provide No Action letters to sandbox participants.133 If an
application is declined, some sandboxes provide applicants with written reasons and the
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opportunity to modify their application or to re-apply.134 (Canadian administrative law does not
require written reasons in every case.135) Several sandboxes, including Utah’s legal innovation
sandbox and Ontario’s, also provide for appeal or review of these decisions.136

PHASE 2: PREPARATION TO ENTER THE SANDBOX
If an application is accepted, the sandbox administrator then determines the terms that will
govern the participant’s “play” in the sandbox. In addition to the general parameters and conditions
described above, the sandbox authority works with each admitted participant to establish
parameters and conditions tailored to the specific pilot.137 These case-by-case parameters and
conditions, each of which is described further below, could address regulatory relief instruments,
scale limitations, risk mitigation and consumer protection requirements, reporting and evaluation
terms, and liability and insurance issues. Individuals and entities admitted to the sandbox are often
provided with a letter or agreement that sets out these parameters and conditions.138
A. REGULATORY RELIEF INSTRUMENTS
The sandbox authority can apply special regulatory instruments, sometimes described as
“sandbox tools,” to limit, alleviate, suspend, waive, or delay the application of existing regulatory
or licensing requirements on a case-by-case basis, while a product or service is being tested in the

134
For example, if the Utah Innovation Office denies a sandbox application, it must include a brief written
explanation supporting the finding: see Utah Supreme Court Standing Order No. 15, supra note 58, at 12-13 and
INNOVATION OFFICE MANUAL, supra note 102, at 6-7. If its application is denied, an entity can submit a request for
reconsideration. If the Innovation Office denies the reconsideration, then the entity can appeal to the Utah Supreme
Court.
135
Vavilov, supra note 128, at paras 77, 119.
136
INNOVATION OFFICE MANUAL, supra note 102; see also Access to Innovation: FAQs, L. SOC’Y ONT.
(LSO), lso.ca/about-lso/access-to-innovation/faqs (last visited Feb. 15, 2022)
137
Toronto Centre, supra note 21, at 6-7; Joint Report, supra note 25, at 25-26.
138
CARMICHAEL ET AL, supra note 76, at 7.

39

THE LEGAL INNOVATION SANDBOX

sandbox.139 Trade publications140 and academics141 have developed taxonomies for distinguishing
the various forms of regulatory relief that can be offered in sandbox and similar contexts. In general
they include authorizations, licenses, and charters (which affirmatively authorize a participant to
do a particular thing, usually with restrictions, without the having to assume the burden of seeking
a full regulatory license);142 rule waivers (which waive the application of a particular rule);143 and
“No Action” letters (which assure the participant that the regulator will not bring enforcement
action against the participant’s conduct, so long as the participant complies with agreed-upon
parameters).144 Any of these mechanisms could be accompanied by informal regulatory
guidance.145 As well, any of them could help form the evidentiary foundation to justify subsequent,
more comprehensive regulatory or legislative change.146 In the legal innovation sandbox context,
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the most obvious mechanism for regulatory relief would be the No Action letter, which the British
Columbia legal innovation sandbox uses. A sandbox could also waive the application of the
“unauthorized practice of law” rule for one or a defined group of applicants.147 Both tools would
probably be comparable in practice, so long as the waiver was accompanied by the same kinds of
prescribed parameters and conditions that would be incorporated into a No Action letter.
There will also be also times when a proposed innovation does not in fact require regulatory
relief because, though it may be novel, strictly speaking it is not prohibited by existing regulatory
requirements. In that case, it is still open to the regulator to provide a party with formal,
individualized guidance as to how existing regulatory requirements would apply to its proposed
new product or practice.
B. SCALE LIMITATIONS
To protect consumers and the market, fintech sandbox authorities are advised to limit the
scale of a participant’s operations in terms of duration and geographical scope, the number and
type of customers, the number or value of transactions, the value of capital, etc.148 In the legal
innovation sandbox context, the equivalent is probably the goal of protecting members of the
public, and the rule of law. But scope limitations, including on number of clients and the nature of
legal services provided, will be just as important in order to control the size of an untested new
product or practice, and any attendant risks.149 As part of defining the experiment’s scope, sandbox

REGUL. 75 (2020) (arguing for a more sweeping normative reorientation for financial regulation, and arguing that
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administrators should ensure that sandbox participants have in place the capacity, skills, resources,
and infrastructure (including adequate data storage and data security measures) needed to function
responsibly at the defined scale.
A participant should spend only as much time in the sandbox as necessary to achieve the
sandbox’s goals, especially since permitting a firm to “hang out” in the sandbox can exacerbate
what we might think of as the regulatory privilege that sandbox participants enjoy.150 According to
the World Bank, speaking about fintech sandboxes, testing periods should be long enough to allow
sandbox authorities to understand the impact of the new product or practice being tested, but not
so long as to mimic licensing without having met the full requirements.151 The appropriate testing
period for legal innovation sandboxes may not, at this stage, be amenable to a one-size-fits-all
temporal limit. Utah’s legal innovation sandbox, for one, makes determinations about timing on a
more case-by-case basis.152 In any event, the general principle articulated by the World Bank –
ensuring adequate testing but not establishing a de facto parallel licensing regime – should apply.
C. STRATEGIES TO MITIGATE RISK AND PROTECT CONSUMERS
In addition to scale limitations, the sandbox authority should work with sandbox
participants to develop explicit risk mitigation and public safeguard strategies. Ultimately it is the
regulator’s responsibility to ensure that the risk associated with the sandbox is mitigated
appropriately. However, given that the sandbox is an optional program premised on participants’

like the risk of bad legal advice, are generic and apply across the board; others, perhaps flowing from the seriousness
of the issue at stake, may not.
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ongoing engagement with the regulator, the scope for working in a collaborative, outcome-oriented
way with sandbox participants should be relatively broad.
The sandbox authority should develop explicit, ex ante risk-mitigating and publicsafeguarding regulatory priorities. In order to ensure that the sandbox remains flexible and its
outcomes congruent with its goals, and bearing in mind that each sandbox experiment will be
unique, the details of exactly how each participant will ensure those regulatory goals are met can
and should be left for the participants to fill out (with input and approval from the regulator).153
This kind of high-level, principles-based approach to mitigating risks and meeting regulatory
objectives is not appropriate in all environments. However, the sandbox seems particularly well
suited to it: experiments are characterized by uncertainty about the best ways to mitigate risk and
protect the public, since they involve new products and practices; experiments are controlled and
limited in scope, and receive case-by-case attention from the sandbox authority; and the sandbox
requires ongoing communication and reporting of participants. Allowing participants to develop
their own detailed means for achieving the regulatory objectives allows the regulator, too, to learn
about what seems to work best in a variety of new contexts about which it would not otherwise
have granular information.
Of course, this is not to say that there is nothing to be learned from how other sandbox
experiments have sought to mitigate risk. Past practice is a useful baseline and a source of
information. For example, in some fintech sandboxes, participants have been required to disclose
the fact of their sandbox participation to consumers, to outline foreseeable risks, and to obtain
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This is consistent with the management-based or new governance approach: see, e.g., Cary Coglianese &
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consumers’ informed consent.154 A complaint mechanism could also be established, through which
consumers could submit concerns to the sandbox participant and/or directly to the sandbox
authority.155 The sandbox authority could also require participants to develop consumersafeguarding exit strategies, somewhat like the “living wills” that were developed in the banking
context, which could be implemented at the planned end of the pilot or in the event that unforeseen
circumstances or unacceptable risk materialize.156
D. REPORTING AND EVALUATION REQUIREMENTS
The sandbox authority should require that participants report regularly on their progress. It
should specify the expected form and frequency of reports, as well as the metrics that will be used
to evaluate pilots while in and when exiting the sandbox.157 Although many elements of the riskversus-benefits assessment are unknown or speculative before actual experimentation takes place,
sandbox authorities should have the capacity to at least set reporting requirements that are
proportional to assessed risk, erring on the side of caution and reviewing them as evidence
accumulates.
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Participants should also be required to disclose, in a timely manner, any significant issues
that have arisen whether or not they were specifically contemplated by the established reporting
requirements, and any consumer complaints. These are not details that can be delegated to the
participant: they are essential components of regulatory oversight. Reporting requirements should
provide the sandbox authority with sufficient, timely information to monitor experiments, ensuring
a degree of proportionality between the risks being run and the regulatory obligations imposed.
The sandbox approach allows the intensity of reporting requirements to be calibrated to each
specific experiment.158 For example, participants in Utah’s legal sandbox are assigned one of four
risk levels, each of which comes with different reporting requirements.159 Depending on their
assigned risk level, Utah sandbox participants must submit reports on a quarterly basis (for the lowrisk category) or a monthly one (for the other three categories).160
E. LIABILITY AND INSURANCE ISSUES
Sandbox regulatory waivers do not insulate sandbox participants from civil liability to
consumers harmed by their activities.161 Questions around liability, insurance, and indemnification
are best addressed before the sandbox begins accepting participants.162 The authority may require
participants to be insured, or to set aside resources for a compensation fund, as a condition for
entering the sandbox.163 However, insisting on insurance for a novel product, or on a compensation
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fund from an early-stage start-up, could prevent otherwise promising access to justice initiatives
from being able to participate. In those situations a sandbox authority could decide that insurance
is not required, in which case sandbox participants should disclose the fact that they are not insured
as part of obtaining consumers’ informed consent.

PHASE 3: EXPERIMENTATION IN THE SANDBOX
Once an individual or entity is granted entry, it can experiment in the sandbox for the
agreed-upon duration, so long as it fulfills all conditions and reporting obligations. While
experimentation is ongoing, the sandbox authority monitors and supports participants. It should
review participants’ reports, hold informal check-ins, regularly communicate with participants,
reduce or increase reporting requirements as the authority deems necessary based on the
information it is gathering, and look for indicia of possible consumer harm. Monitoring may also
involve receiving consumer complaints, conducting consumer surveys, reviewing media reports,
and taking more proactive actions, such as running announced audits and “secret shopper tests.”164
This ongoing reporting, monitoring, and evaluation can take on a collaborative and iterative spirit.
For example, participants in the UK’s FCA sandbox are assigned a dedicated case officer to support
the success of the pilot, to assist with navigating the regulatory framework, and to ensure that the
appropriate safeguards are in place. The result, in theory at least, is an experimental model based
on ongoing discussion and cooperation.165
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That said, the overriding objective of protecting the public interest must not be
compromised for the sake of cooperation. As functional as the consumer-oriented lens may be in
assessing innovative potential and benefit, regulators also have a distinct and irreducible obligation
to try to advance their regulatory goals. They must be able to bring enforcement action where
necessary.166 Enforcement action – meaning, primarily, suspension from or termination of a
participant’s sandbox experiment – must be available where a sandbox participant is exceeding the
scope of its regulatory relief, failing to comply with other applicable regulatory requirements,
failing to cooperate with the authority, engaging in misrepresentations, or otherwise violating the
spirit or the terms of its sandbox agreement.167 A participant could also be removed if the risks of
the pilot are demonstrated to exceed the benefits, or if sandbox objectives are clearly not being
achieved.168
In Utah’s legal sandbox, the sandbox authority uses reporting data as well as any evidence
of non-compliance to assign participants one of four consumer harm ratings: Green (Satisfactory),
Yellow (Under Watch), Red (Suspended), or Black (Terminated).169 The categories help determine
what actions, on the part of the sandbox authority, may be warranted. For example, if the category
is Yellow, the Utah sandbox authority works with the participant to determine a remediation plan.
An entity will only be categorized as Black and removed from the sandbox after “continued failure
to remediate past evidence of consumer harm or for evidence of intentional bad acts (fraud, theft,
etc.).”170
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PHASE 4: AUTHORIZATION TO EXIT THE SANDBOX
As noted above, some fintech sandboxes have established defined testing periods, after
which the fintech innovator must either move “up” (to be regulated normally outside the sandbox),
or “out” (that is, to wrap up operations). Utah’s legal innovation sandbox generally authorizes
participants for an initial term of 24 months from the date they launch their services.171 However,
Utah’s sandbox authority has also developed qualitative and quantitative assessment methods to
assess whether a participant is ready to exit the sandbox. Before applying to exit, sandbox
participants must have provided a certain number of legal services, and been categorized as ‘Green’
for a certain number of consecutive months.172 (Actual numbers depend on the participant’s initial
assigned risk level.) Once a participant becomes eligible to exit, the sandbox authority reviews its
application and reporting, and decides whether to recommend that the Utah Supreme Court
authorize the participant to continue operating outside the sandbox. This authorization can be full
or restricted.173 After exiting, former participants must continue to submit reports, and must comply
with the operational scope outlined in their original, or modified, authorization order from the
Supreme Court.174 Utah’s legal sandbox decision standard is risk-based: participants are allowed
to exit the sandbox and continuing operating without having to demonstrate consumer benefit,
unless the data show that the tested product, service, or model causes harm to consumers.175 This
approach reflects an appropriate regulatory focus on risk, leaving consumer benefit to be
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determined through the mechanism of consumer choice. It also provides some certainty for sandbox
participants, allowing them to make longer term investments into the development of their new
product or service, and to improve it based on ongoing feedback from customers.
Drawing on sandbox results and its own learning, the regulator can also take more
comprehensive action, such as authorizing a class of entities to provide a particular service,
pursuing regulatory reform within the scope of its statutory authority, and/or issuing guidance to
clarify how certain regulatory requirements apply to certain products, services, or models.176 When
a participant exits Utah’s sandbox, the sandbox authority can recommend that the Utah Supreme
Court authorize only that participant to do a particular thing, or authorize a class of entities to do
that thing.177 Broader authorizations will not, of course, be automatic. Where possible, however,
translating sandbox learning into a broader, potentially sector-wide regulatory move increases the
positive impact of that learning, evens the competitive playing field for sandbox non-participants,
reduces actual or perceived unfairness, and is more likely to ensure across the board, in an
evidence-based way, that “the burden imposed on those being regulated is proportionate to, and an
intelligent and effective response to, the risk of harm.”178

4: CONSIDERATIONS FOR DESIGNING AND OPERATING A LEGAL SANDBOX
While fintech sandbox participants, and those in the Utah legal sandbox, generally work
through the same four-phase journey described above, every jurisdiction will face its own particular
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challenges and opportunities. One of the benefits of the sandbox model is that it can be purposebuilt in a way that uniquely reflects its context.
The sandbox is not just a tool for permitting innovation in legal services provision. It is an
innovative tool unto itself. Accordingly, those involved in developing, running, and experimenting
in the sandbox may themselves benefit from exposure to some of the more iterative design
strategies, like human-centered design, that have been developed outside the legal profession.179
As well, below are a few final design considerations that a sandbox authority may wish to bear in
mind.

CONSIDERATION 1: BALANCING PLANNING WITH AGILITY
Best practice guidelines suggest that before announcing a sandbox, a regulator should take
the time to evaluate its feasibility, demand, and risks, and to define its objectives.180 The sandbox
planning process could also include an assessment, if appropriate, of what other innovationpromoting tools could be used in conjunction with the sandbox; a mapping of the full sandbox
journey; and consultation with consumers, relevant profession(s), and regulators in other
jurisdictions. As a guideline, it may be helpful to know that fintech sandbox development in
advanced markets has usually taken a minimum of six months.181
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Lawyers are trained to aim for perfection, not continuous improvement of their services
through live testing in the world. However, design thinking would suggest that after an initial
development phase, regulators should launch a sandbox relatively quickly as an MVP (minimal
viable product), and then iterate as needed.182 Sandboxes tend to evolve after launch, in response
to local conditions and the results of ongoing testing and evaluation. While core consumer
protections and legal profession values should be maintained through a sandox’s lifespan – they
are the non-negotiable guardrails bounding the experiment – too much rigidity will hamper the
sandbox’s effectiveness.183

CONSIDERATION 2: LEGITIMACY, REPRESENTATION, AND JUSTICE
Both as it plans the sandbox and throughout a sandbox’s lifespan, the regulator and/or
sandbox authority should engage with the public and key stakeholders, including members of the
legal profession who may have concerns about the initiative.184 It is at least as important, however,
to consult with those who represent vulnerable or marginalized populations, such as people who
experience barriers to accessing justice (due to geography, low income, disability, and other
factors) and their community advocates, and self-represented litigants. In the United States and
beyond, sandboxes should be developed and implemented in a way that advances equity, civil
rights, and racial justice.185 In Canada, in keeping with the legal profession’s (and individuals’)
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obligation to work toward reconciliation with Indigenous peoples, it should be essential to ensure
that Indigenous voices are consulted, especially in evaluating any proposal that could plausibly
affect Indigenous people.186 Fintech sandboxes have not generally built out comprehensive
consultation mechanisms, especially for ensuring that marginalized populations are given a voice
in sandbox design or operations. Especially in the access to justice context, however, and given the
broader public concerns about legitimacy, fairness, and justice that attend the legal innovation
context, representativeness, equity, and diversity require more careful and structured attention
here.187

CONSIDERATION 3: ALLOCATING SUFFICIENT RESOURCES
Sandboxes, like evidence-based, learning-oriented, and iterative regulatory approaches
generally, can be resource intensive. A poorly resourced sandbox could actually endanger
consumers and undermine regulatory goals.188 A sandbox does not necessarily require vast resource
to run, but it will require some additional resources.189 A sandbox authority should not aim to
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conserve resources by skimping on oversight, or uncritically accepting participants’ own accounts
of their capacity or bona fides.190 The sandbox authority should carefully consider what resources
are available and then adapt sandbox ambitions and design accordingly, with conscious attention
to ensuring that it is not compromising the public interest or professional ethical obligations. For
example, a sandbox with less funding may want to implement a cohort model with rigorous preapplication vetting, narrower eligibility criteria, and shorter testing windows.191
Sandbox administrators should have, or have access to, the expertise needed to design and
operate a robust and adaptable sandbox, to advise sandbox applicants and participants, to assess
complex applications, to understand and mitigate risks, to define testing plans and performance
metrics, and to supervise and evaluate sandbox participants.192 Technology and subject matter
experts should be on the sandbox team or consulted as needed. While legal profession regulatory
staff will already have some of these skills, there are almost certainly aspects of sandbox operation
for which additional training or staffing is warranted.

CONSIDERATION 4: COLLECTING DATA AND EVALUATING OUTCOMES
Sandbox design should incorporate a detailed data collection and evaluation plan. Not only
does data enable the sandbox authority to monitor and evaluate individual sandbox participants,
but it also allows it to assess overall sandbox impact and functioning and to develop evidencedriven regulations and responses. The data that a regulator can gain access to through a sandbox is
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perhaps its greatest benefit, from a regulatory quality perspective, and yet experience from the
fintech sector suggests that sandboxes do not always take advantage of it.193
A 2020 World Bank paper proposed a measurement framework for evaluating the impact
of fintech sandboxes, which could be adapted and applied to legal sandboxes.194 As depicted in
Figure 1, the framework consists of three measurement stages, and four measurements levels that
cut across them. The stages indicate when measurement occurs, while the levels capture what is
being measured. Data are collected at an initial stage, on an ongoing basis, and at pre-determined
points in time (e.g., after a certain duration, or at the end of a sandbox process). At each of these
stages, metrics are employed to assess four outcome types: country and sector level outcome
metrics assessing how well the sandbox contributes to overarching policy goals;195 regulatory
outcome metrics including changes implemented and insights gleaned; firm-level or industry-level
outcome metrics;196 and, operational or institutional outcome metrics that “assess the ongoing
appropriateness of the sandbox internally, analyze the resources and capacities used during
implementation, and evaluate if the sandbox is contributing to overarching institutional goals.”197
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The World Bank paper emphasizes that relevant data should be collected from a diversity
of sources including sandbox participant reports, consumer surveys, consumer complaint forms,
media reports, and market research. To ensure impartial evaluation, the sandbox authority may
choose to employ a third-party evaluator. The Utah legal sandbox does so: its independent
evaluator is the Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System (IAALS), a research
center at the University of Denver. The Utah Supreme Court says that ultimately, it intends to use
the collected data to test the hypothesis that “allowing non-traditional legal models will lead to
improvements in both the accessibility and affordability of legal services.”198

FIGURE 1: SUGGESTED MEASUREMENT FRAMEWORK FOR A REGULATORY SANDBOX199

CONSIDERATION 5: INTRODUCING AN ARM’S LENGTH SANDBOX ADMINISTRATOR

Both because they have a potential vested interest in the existing legal services provision
model, and because legal regulators’ training is not obviously suited to running an innovation

198

Memorandum from the Office of Legal Services Innovation to the Utah State Bar (Feb. 23, 2021),
utahinnovationoffice.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Open-Letter-to-Bar-Committee-Feb-2021.pdf.
199
This figure is taken from Appaya et al., supra note 22, at 42 fig. 4.1.
55

THE LEGAL INNOVATION SANDBOX

sandbox, regulators should consider establishing some form of independent oversight or sandbox
operator.200
Some jurisdictions have adopted a bifurcated model under which a regulator maintains its
traditional role, and its sandbox is largely run by an arm’s length, specialist body presumed to have
the necessary expertise, resources, and independence to oversee the sandbox.201 The regulator
might retain final authorization and licensing authority. For example, the Utah Supreme Court
created the Office of Legal Service Innovation (“Innovation Office”) as an independent body to
oversee and develop its sandbox. The Innovation Office is made up of court-appointed volunteer
lawyers and other professionals, including those with backgrounds in economics and data
analysis.202 The Innovation Office includes staff, an Executive Committee, and a Board, each with
different responsibilities.
In British Columbia, the Law Society has established an Independent Advisory Board for
its innovation sandbox, comprised of a majority of non-Benchers.203 Law Society Staff prepare
materials and make recommendations to the Advisory Board, which then deliberates and either
refers matters back to the staff, or itself makes a recommendation that goes to the Executive
Committee of the Benchers for a final decision. The BC model does not provide the same degree
of arm’s length decision-making that Utah’s Innovation Office provides, although it offers a degree
of independence.
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CONCLUSION
Regulatory sandboxes are not a magic regulatory reform bullet. They are one tool in the
toolbox and, like any other tool, they will not be ideal for all situations. In the legal innovation
context across Anglo-American jurisdictions, where innovation within the regulatory sphere has
long been statutorily limited, the structured, experimental, and time-limited sandbox strategy holds
promise as a controlled and effective mechanism for catalyzing change.204 Given that innovation
in legal services is nascent at best while fintech has become a fast-moving global phenomenon, the
sandbox model is in fact better suited to the legal innovation context than to the fintech context in
which it originated. Legal innovation sandboxes also present the opportunity to consider what
provisions in legal regulation may be formalistic or protectionist, and what novel strategies for
delivering legal services may be congruent with the objectives of protecting the public and fostering
the rule of law. The sandbox itself is an experiment, which can be in a position to learn from its
own experience and to improve its own performance. And, as time goes on, regulators may find
that the knowledge they have acquired through sandbox projects will also point to other policy
options as well.
Innovation and regulation are in a reflexive relationship; each affects the other on an
ongoing basis. Sandboxes can not only increase the relevance and quality of legal services, but also
the relevance and quality of regulation. As a best-case scenario, where any potential conflicts of
interest on the part of legal sandbox regulators or administrators are mitigated, the enhanced
regulator-participant collaboration the sandbox offers could help nurture a sector-wide mindset and
ecosystem that is more open to novel initiatives. This could catalyze meaningful change in how
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legal services are delivered.205 At its most ambitious, a sandbox may hold the potential to
meaningfully reshape the relationship between regulator and regulated without compromising
regulatory commitments or authority. It may hold the potential – if and only if well implemented
– to free a regulator from literalism and some of its least justified rule-policing obligations, while
still ensuring that the public interest is safeguarded, strengthening its regulatory information base,
and working to manage the extent of disruption to an existing industry.
Lawyers’ obligations to the public and the rule of law, in a changing world, may require all
of us to consider new ways of delivering legal services. In North America and elsewhere, the access
to justice crisis has stubbornly resisted most other efforts to date. Lawyers’ and legal profession
regulators’ social license at this stage depends on their willingness to take these problems seriously.
When properly designed, resourced, and implemented, the legal innovation sandbox holds real
potential to foster creative thinking about how legal services can be provided to the public in more
accessible, affordable, and equitable ways.

205

Jeník & Lauer, supra note 80, at 10; Zetzsche et al., supra note 27.
58

